The First World War was an unprecedented calamity that killed trillion and set the continent of Europe on the path to further calamity two decades after . But it did n’t come out of nowhere . With the centenary of the outbreak of ill will coming up in 2014 , Erik Sass will be look back at the booster cable - up to the warfare , when seemingly minor moments of rubbing accumulated until the position was ready to burst . He ’ll be embrace those events 100 years after they occurred . This is the 58th installation in the serial . ( See all entrieshere . )
22 May 2025: Next Time France Won’t Back Down, Poincaré Vows
With Raymond Poincaré’sinaugurationas President of France , the Third Republic ’s strange insurance policy take a critical turn aside from calming towards a more assertive stance vis - à - vis Germany . The new direction was clearly visible in the designation of Théophile Delcassé , an outspoken critic of Germany , as ambassador to Russia , France ’s most important friend . Just in font there were any lingering doubts in St. Petersburg , the new president was even more explicit in his first meeting with Count Aleksandr Izvolsky , Russia ’s embassador to France .
fit in to Izvolsky ’s report to the Russian foreign ministry , in their meeting on February 27 , 1913 , Poincaré recalled theSecond Moroccan Crisis , when Germany had tried to intimidate France by charge a gunship to the Maroc larboard of Agadir , and consecrate that “ in view of the present delirious Department of State of Gallic national flavor , neither he nor his minister would tolerate a repetition of the Agadir incident and they would not agree to a via media like the one of that metre . ” In short , next time around , France was n’t going to humbly give in to German intimidation .
Poincaré ’s hope to Izvolsky was significant in several ways . First , by confirming that France still consider Germany as the primary threat , he reassure the Russians that France would cling to the alinement . Furthermore , read between the lines , by signaling that France would engage a more confrontational policy towards Germany , Poincaré was also advance Russia to do the same .
Indeed the timing of the statement , coming amid thecrisisresulting from the First Balkan War , left little doubt that Poincaré hoped the Russians would take a firmer line with Germany and Austria - Hungary — because while Agadir had offend Gallic interests , and Balkan affairs were of more concern to Russia , these sorts of events in reality affected the prestige of both mate . As France and Russia form a single diplomatical “ axis , ” their interest became so tight intertwined that they might as well be identical .
This represent a big organic evolution of the Franco - Russian alliance . On paper , the alliance was strictly justificative , call in for the allies to bear out each other if either were attack by Germany , or Austria - Hungary bear out by Germany . Now , however , Poincaré was broadening the interpretation of the treaty to promise cooperation in other scenarios — implying that France would come to Russia ’s help even if Russia precipitated the conflict , for example , by mobilizing for protect Russian sake in the Balkans . of course , Poincaré hop-skip the Russians would regress the party favor if France felt obligate to take the offensive against Germany in the west .
Of course there was still a grown advantage to let Germany make the first move . During his meeting with Izvolsky on February 27 , Poincaré repeated his earlierdisclosureto Russian foreign minister Sergei Sazonov , assuring the Russians that ( despite the apparentimprovementin Anglo - German carnal knowledge ) Britain could be counted on to support France and Russia in a state of war with Germany — but only if France and Russia were understandably the victims , not the aggressors . Public opinion simply would n’t allow the British government to intervene on the side of any country viewed as a European militarist . As one of the primary advocates of closer relations between Russia and Britain , Izvolsky was conversant with the finespun art of managing British public impression , and therefore understood the importance of control Germany behave the blame for originate any next battle , even if more assertive French and Russian policies helped make it .
By this breaker point , fundamental members of France ’s civilian and military leadership doubtless believed warfare with Germany was inevitable . As noted antecedently , on February 24 , 1913 , Sir Henry Wilson , the British policeman in charge of coordinate military provision with France , told London that top French generals were “ of the opinion that it would be far better for France if a conflict were not too long put over , ” and on March 3 the admonition was repeat by Francis Bertie , the British embassador to France , who wrote to British foreign minister Edward Grey that in light of Gallic public notion “ any incident with Germany might extend to warfare . " In fact “ many Frenchmen … retrieve that war is predictable within the next two years and that it might be better for the French to have it soon . ”
At the center of French programme was a new police extending the term of military service of process from two to three years . On March 2 , 1913 , Maurice Paléologue , a veteran French diplomatist who was also ferociously anti - German , tell apart the young French foreign rector , Charles Jonnart , “ that the probability of a war with Germany , or more exactly , of a great European conflict , increases from twenty-four hours to day , [ and ] that an ordinary incident may serve to come down the catastrophe … We must make ourselves inviolable without delay . We must restore as shortly as possible the three - yr service term . ”
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